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1. Introduction 
Agents trading financial assets might face significant common values uncertainty because of 
the uncertain underlying cash flow stream. In particular, in secondary markets the seller of a 
financial asset must not necessarily posses better information about the value of the asset than 
a potential buyer but both agents can spend resources to obtain information. This paper 
analyzes double auction with endogenous information acquisition in such an environment. A 
buyer and a seller seek to agree on a price at which to trade an asset whose true value is 
unknown to both parties ex ante. The common value component (quality) of the asset can be 
either high or low. It is common knowledge that for both realizations the buyer’s private 
valuation for the asset is higher than the seller’s private valuation by a fixed margin. Prior to 
the auction stage the agents can acquire information about the true quality.  
Given that there are always gains form trade and that acquiring information is costly, 
any socially efficient outcome must have trade taking place with probability one and without 
either party acquiring information irrespective of how the surplus is divided. This paper 
shows that if information acquisition is not observable endogenous information can cause 
three types of inefficiencies in double auction. No pure strategy equilibrium with efficient 
trade may exist. Any full trading equilibria may exhibit costly information acquisition by both 
agents. The Akerlof’s lemons problem may arise as a self-fulfilling equilibrium and only 
partial trade occurs. The intuition for these observations is the following.  
To get started, does the trading at the expected quality and the equal-split outcome 
constitute an equilibrium? Suppose the buyer acquires information and speculates. If  the 
quality of the asset is low the informed buyer submits a low bid and no trade occurs. If the 
quality is high trade occurs and the seller suffers an endogenous lemons problem while the 
buyer makes some speculative profits. However, speculation causes an opportunity cost in the 
sense that the buyer forgoes some surplus in the low state. The seller faces an analogous 
incentive problem. So the more surplus the buyer is to obtain the higher the buyer’s 
opportunity cost of speculation but the lower the seller’s opportunity cost of speculation.  
The following cases can arise. (1) If the information cost equals the speculative profit 
net the maximum of the opportunity cost of speculation of both agents then the equal-split 
trading equilibrium is the unique efficient equilibrium. Denote cmin as this critical (minimum 
allowable) level of the information cost. (2) If the information cost is smaller than cmin but 
larger than the trading surplus, no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exists. In the no trade 
equilibrium no agent acquires too expensive and non-exploitable information. Because of the 
endogenous lemons problem the buyer submits a low offer and the seller submits a high offer. 
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In equilibrium there is symmetric information and yet no trade occurs. This result is different 
from Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) since the 
trading gain is common knowledge. It is also different from Akerlof (1970) and Gresik (1991) 
since there is no asymmetric information about the common value component of the asset.   
(3) If the information cost is lower than cmin  as well as the trading surplus, any trading 
equilibrium exhibits costly information acquisition. It is the desire of the agents to transact on 
one hand and their concerns about making bad deals due to endogenous lemons problems on 
the other hand, that induce both the buyer and the seller to acquire information. This 
observation is related to Matthews (1984) and Hausch and Li (1993) who show that bidders 
acquire excessive information in common values auctions. (4) If the agents face asymmetric 
information cost the Akerlof’s lemons problem arises as a self-fulfilling equilibrium. The 
agent with low information cost acquires information and only partial trading equilibria exist.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
model. Section 3 shows that if information acquisition is not observable the set of efficient 
equilibria depends on the information cost and three types of inefficiencies can arise. Section 
4 shows that if information acquisition is observable endogenous information has no adverse 
consequences for efficient trade. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs and 
Appendix B extends the basic model to the case where the quality of the asset is a continuous 
random variable and the agents can acquire n∈N units of information.  
 
2. The Model 
A risk neutral buyer and a risk neutral seller seek to agree on a price p at which to trade an 
asset. The asset is worth v+∆ to the buyer and v−∆ to the seller where v is the uncertain 
common value component (quality) of the asset and ∆>0 is the private value component 
(idiosyncratic taste parameter). If the agents agree on a price the trading surplus 2∆ is realized 
and UB=v+∆−p and US=p−(v−∆). If no trade occurs the payoff is normalized to zero.  
Ex ante the agents have identical information about the uncertain common value  v 
which is either vL or vH with equal probability, where vL,vH∈R+ and vH>vL>∆. Prior to the 
trading stage agent i can buy ni∈{0,1} unit of information where nB and nS are chosen 
simultaneously. If no information is bought the agent has the prior information. If agent i pays 
the cost c≥0, agent i knows the true value. Then the agents play a double auction, i.e. the 
buyer submits a bid price b and the seller submits an ask price s simultaneously. If b≥s then 
the asset changes hand at the mean price p=(b+s)/2. Otherwise there is no trade. To save on 
some case distinctions it is assumed that ∆<(vH−vL)/8 (Assumption A).  
 3
Assumption A implies that the potential lemons problem is important relative to the 
realization of the trading gain. Before proceeding to the analysis, the following definitions are 
introduced. An equilibrium in which trade occurs with probability one (less than one) is called 
a full (partial) trade equilibrium. An equilibrium is efficient if trade occurs with probability 
one and no agent acquires costly information. An equilibrium exhibits a k-sharing of the total 
surplus 2∆ if the buyer gets the expected surplus ∆−k and the seller gets the expected surplus 
∆+k. Such an equilibrium is called a k-sharing equilibrium. Note a set of (trivial) no trade 
equilibria is given by B=(0,b) and S=(0,s) with b≤vL−∆ and s≥vH+∆. 
 
3.  Equilibria When Information Acquisition Is Not Observable 
3.1  The Set of Efficient Equilibria  
Given that there are always gains form trade any socially efficient outcome must have trade 
taking place with probability one and without either party acquiring costly information. This 
section shows that if information acquisition is not observable by the other party the set of 
efficient equilibria depends on information cost. Since the outside option of the agents is 
normalized to zero any price p∈[E[v]−∆,E[v]+∆] is acceptable for both (uninformed) agents. 
So the set of strategies leading to the set of efficient outcomes satisfying individual rationality 
is B=(0,b) and S=(0,s) with b=s=E[v]+k for k∈[−∆, ∆]. In the k-sharing outcome the buyer 
gets EUB=∆−k and the seller gets EUS=∆+k. When do these strategies constitute best 
responses? 
Suppose the buyer acquires information and speculates. If the buyer sees that v=vL, he 
chooses a bid price bL<s and no trade occurs. Otherwise he chooses bH=s. This response 
yields EUB=0.5[(vH+∆)−(E[v]+k)]−c=(vH−vL)/4+0.5(∆−k)−c. If (vH−vL)/4+0.5(∆−k)−c>∆−k, 
the efficient k-sharing outcome does not constitute an equilibrium. Analogously, if 
(vH−vL)/4+0.5(∆+k)−c>∆+k, the best response of the seller to B=(0,b) with b=E[v]+k is to 
choose S=(1,sL,sH) with sL=b and sH>b. So if c<min{(vH−vL)/4−0.5(∆−k), (vH−vL)/4 
−0.5(∆+k)}=(vH−vL)/4−0.5⋅min{∆−k,∆+k}, no efficient k-sharing equilibrium exists.  
 
Proposition 1 
Suppose that information acquisition is not observable and k∈[−∆,∆].  
Iff c<(vH−vL)/4−0.5(∆−|k|) then no efficient k-sharing Nash equilibrium exists. 
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Proposition 1 has a simple economic interpretation. (vH−vL)/4=π is the expected speculative 
profit an informed agent makes and 0.5(∆−|k|) is the expected opportunity cost of speculation. 
If trade is supposed to be carry out at the price E[v]+k for k∈[−∆, ∆], the buyer gets 
EUB=∆−k and the seller gets EUS=∆+k. If the buyer acquires information and speculates, no 
trade occurs in the low state and ex ante he forgoes the expected surplus 0.5(∆−k)≡cBSp(k). If 
the seller speculates his opportunity cost of speculation is cSSp(k)=0.5(∆+k). Since the total 
surplus is fixed the opportunity costs of speculation of the buyer and the seller are perfectly 
negatively correlated. If π>c+min{cBSp(k),cSSp(k)}=c+0.5(∆−|k|) one agent has an incentive to 
speculate and trade at the price p=E[v]+k is not an equilibrium.  
 
Corollary 1 
(a) If c≥(vH−vL)/4 any efficient k-sharing outcome is attainable as a Nash equilibrium. 
(b) If c=cmin≡(vH−vL)/4−0.5∆, only the equal-split (k=0) outcome is attainable as an efficient 
Nash equilibrium. If c<cmin then no efficient Nash equilibrium exists. 
 
Remark 1 
Suppose the probability for vL is q∈(0,1). Analogously, one can derive the following results.   
(a) Iff c<q(1−q)(vL+vH)−max{q(∆−k),(1−q)(∆+k)}, no efficient k-sharing equilibrium exists.  
(b) If c=cmin≡q(1−q)(vL+vH)−2q(1−q)∆, only the k=(2q−1)∆-sharing outcome constitutes an 
efficient equilibrium. If c<cmin then no efficient equilibrium exists. 
 
3.2  An Information Acquisition Dilemma 
This section shows that endogenous information can cause an information acquisition 
dilemma. If the information cost of both agents is low the desire of the agents to transact on 
one hand and their concerns about making bad deals due to endogenous lemons problems on 
the other hand induce both agents to acquire information in any full trade equilibrium. If only 
one agent faces low information cost, the Akerlof’s lemons problem arises as a self-fulfilling 
equilibrium and no full trade equilibrium exists.  
 
Proposition 2 
Suppose that information acquisition is not observable and k∈[−∆, ∆]. If c≤∆−|k|, then a full 
trade k-sharing Nash equilibrium exists. In any full trade equilibrium both agents acquire 
information and EUB=∆−k−c and EUS=∆+k−c.  
 5
This observation is related to Matthews (1984) and Hausch and Li (1993) who analyze 
information acquisition in common values auctions. They show that the bidders acquire 
excessive information. The key difference between this bargaining model and most auction 
models (see also Milgrom (1981) and Persico (2000)) is that their auctioneer (seller) is non-
strategic and ignores the lemons problem.1 Bergemann and Valimäki (2002) employ a 
mechanism design approach and show that any ex post efficient allocation mechanism causes 
an ex ante information acquisition inefficiency. However, they point out  that their Theorem 2 
is a local result and state (p.1027) “In particular, the theorem is not a statement about the 
(Nash) equilibrium decisions of agents.” In this model uB(⋅) and uS(⋅) are in some sense 
supermodular in v. In equilibrium the agents acquire too much information although their 
local prediction is that the agents acquire too little information relative to the social optimum. 
 
Proposition 3 
Suppose that information acquisition is not observable and k∈[−∆,∆]. If cS≤0.5(∆+k) and  
cB>2∆, only partial trade k-sharing Nash equilibria exist. In any such equilibrium the seller 
acquires information and EUB=0.5(∆−k) and EUS=0.5(∆+k)−c.  
 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is similar. Since cB>2∆ there exists no equilibrium in 
which the buyer acquires information. Suppose that the uninformed buyer is willing to offer 
full surplus to the seller and chooses b=E[v]+∆. Yet the best response of the seller is to 
acquire information and to speculate because cS≤0.5(∆+k)<(vH−vL)/4−∆ (Assumption A). In 
order to avoid the speculative loss −(vH−vL)/4, the buyer submits a defensive offer which an 
uninformed seller would not “accept”. Therefore, in any equilibrium in which trade is to occur 
with positive probability the seller “must” acquire information and the Akerlof`s lemons 
problem arises as a self-fulfilling equilibrium. If no agent acquires information then no trade 
occurs in equilibrium. 
                                                 
1 Hirshleifer (1971) states “When private information fails to lead to improved productive alignments....,it is 
evident that the individual's  source of gains can only be at the expense of his fellow.”(p.567) “In a world of 
pure exchange, there will in general be private overinvestment in information: resources committed to 
acquisition and to dissimination are both wasted from the social point of view.” (p.574). Cremer and Khalil 
(19829 analyze information acquisition in a principal-agent setting where the agent can acquire information 
about his disutility of production before signing a contract. They show that in equilibrium no information may be 
acquired although the information cost is very low. Reny and Perry (2003) analyze large double auction with 
strategic buyers and strategic sellers but information is exogenous.  
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3.3  A No-Efficient Trade Result 
This section establishes the main result of the paper and shows that no pure strategy 
equilibrium in double auction may exist in which two identically informed agents agree on 
how to divide a surplus. It is not only actual asymmetric information but potential information 
asymmetry due to endogenous information acquisition can already render efficient trade 
unattractive.  
 
Proposition 4 
Suppose that information acquisition is not observable. If ∆<c<(vH−vL)/4−0.5∆ then no pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium with trade exists.  
 
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is the following. Since c>∆ no equilibrium exists in which 
both agents acquire information. Suppose only one agent acquires information. Because of the 
lemons problem trade occurs with probability 0.5. Although the informed agent is to get full 
surplus his expected payoff is EU=∆−c<0. Therefore, in any equilibrium no agent acquires 
too expensive and non-exploitable information. However, since information cost is smaller 
than the speculative profit net the maximum of opportunity cost of speculation, an uninformed 
agent is concerned about the endogenous lemons problem. The buyer submits a low offer and 
the seller submits a high offer. There is symmetric information and yet no trade occurs. 
The reason for this inefficiency result is different from Chatterjee and Samuelson 
(1983) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). Their result is driven by the assumption that 
trading gain is not common knowledge. In this setting the gain from trade is common 
knowledge. There is also a difference between this observation and Akerlof (1970), 
Samuelson (1985) or Gresik (1991) who assume that one agent is better informed about the 
common valuation than the other agent. In this setting it is common knowledge that both 
agents have identical prior information about the common valuation. The threat of potential 
lemons problems due to endogenous information acquisition is the cause for the inefficiency. 
Note, if the agents play mixed strategies (over information acquisition), the no efficient trade 
result may be mitigated in the sense that  trade may occur with positive probability.  
 
4.  Equilibira When Information Acquisition Is Observable 
This section shows that if information acquisition is observable by the other agent at the 
auction stage endogenous information has no adverse consequences in the sense that any 
efficient outcome satisfying individual rationality is attainable as an equilibrium.   
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Proposition 5 
Suppose that information acquisition is observable and k∈[−∆, ∆]. Any efficient k-sharing 
outcome is attainable as a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium irrespective of information cost. 
 
Since information acquisition is observable at the bargaining stage, an agent can also 
condition his offer strategy on the fact whether the other agent is better informed or not. 
Suppose ex ante the agents agree to trade at E[v] but the buyer acquires information and tries 
to exploit the seller. At the bargaining stage it is common knowledge that the buyer is better 
informed. So the seller does not submit the offer E[v] anymore. In order to account for the 
lemons problem the seller submits a high offer. Since the buyer anticipates the lemons 
problem he himself creates by acquiring information, his best response is not to acquire 
information. So no agent has an incentive to acquire more information than the counter party. 
However, if information acquisition is not observable, the agents cannot target their offer 
strategies appropriately and are concerned about the endogenous lemons problem.2 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper analyses double auction between an ex ante identically informed buyer and seller  
over the division of a trading surplus with endogenous information and common values and 
derives the following results. If information acquisition is not observable three types of 
inefficiencies can arise. No pure strategy equilibrium with efficient trade may exist. Any full 
trade equilibrium may exhibit costly information acquisition by both agents. The Akerlof’s 
lemons problem may arise as a self-fulfilling equilibrium and only partial trade occurs. If 
information acquisition is observable endogenous information has no adverse consequences 
for efficient trade.  
The basic model can be extended along different dimensions. (1)  If trade is conducted 
via take-it-or-leave-offer bargaining, it is straightforward to show that for 2∆<c<(vH−vL)/4−∆ 
no (pure and mixed strategy) equilibrium with agreement exists.3 (2) Suppose there is a large 
                                                 
2 Proposition 5 is somewhat similar in flavor to Perry and Reny (2002) who show that two-stage bidding can 
achieve allocative efficiency in common values auctions with (exogenous) private information. 
3 Dang (2005) analyses two-period alternating offer bargaining with endogenous information and common 
values and shows that because of endogenous lemons problems and endogenous outside options perfect 
equilibira can have the following properties. (i) For the one period case, the agent responding to a take-it-or-
leave-offer can capture full surplus. (ii) A low discounting of trading surplus, a positive externality of 
information acquisition, and an endogenous lemons problem can cause delay. (iii) The equilibrium payoffs of the 
agents are non-monotonic in the discount factor of trading surplus. 
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number of agents with real trading motives (liquidity traders). Dang (2005a) shows that if the 
liquidity traders behave strategically they themselves acquire information. In particular, the 
large liquidity traders are the ones who determine equilibrium prices. Furthermore, strategic 
liquidity trading constitutes one channel which breaks the inverse relationship between 
informationally efficient prices and the compensation for information cost since the trading 
surplus is fixed. This provides a counterexample to the impossibility result in Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980). (3) The basic model can be used as an ingredient to discuss financial 
contracting in delegated portfolio management in which the liquidity traders hire portfolio 
managers to trade on behalf of them. In such a setting an optimal contract between investor A 
and manager A may also have to take into account the strategic effect on the contract between 
investor B and manager B and vice versa so that portfolio net returns may be endogenous.  
 
Appendix A 
Remark 
Assumption A (∆<(vH−vL)/8) implies that vH−∆>vL+∆.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Claim A : Suppose r,t∈[−∆, ∆]. If c≤0.5⋅(∆+min{r,−t}) then B=S=(1, vL+r, vH+t) are 
best responses and EUB=∆−0.5(r+t)−c and EUS=∆+0.5(r+t)−c. 
Proof : The following arguments show that B is a best response to S. (1) If the buyer 
chooses B as stated above then EUB=0.5[vL+∆−(vL+r)]+0.5[vH+∆−(vH+t)]−c=∆−0.5(r+t)−c≥0 
since ∆−0.5(r+t)≥0.5⋅(∆+min{r,−t})≥c. (2) If the buyer chooses (0,b) with b=vH+t then 
EUB=0.5[vL+∆−(vL+r+vH+t)/2]+0.5[vH+∆−(vH+t)]=∆−(vH−vL)/4−(r+3t)/4. For r=t=−∆, the 
buyers’ expected payoff is maximal and yet EUB=−(vH−vL)/4+2∆<0 (Assumption A). (3) If 
the buyer chooses (0,b) with b=vL+r then EUB=0.5(∆−r). This response is weakly dominated 
by response (1) since c≤0.5(∆−t). So B is a best response to S.4 
Analogously for the seller, if he chooses (0,s) with s=vL+r then EUS=∆+(3r+t)/4− 
(vH−vL)/4<0. If the seller chooses (0,s) with s=vH+t then EUS=0.5(∆+t)≤∆+0.5(r+t)−c since 
c≤0.5(∆+r). So S is a best response to B. For c≤min{0.5(∆−t),0.5(∆+r)}=0.5⋅(∆+min{r,−t}), 
(B,S) constitutes a Nash equilibrium. 
                                                 
4 It is easy to see that the strategy (0,b) with b∈(sL,sH) is strictly dominated by the strategy (0,b) with b=sL. The 
strategy (0,b) with b>sH is (weakly) dominated by the strategy (0,b) with b=sH. The strategy (0,b) with b<sL 
implies no trade and is weakly dominated by B. 
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Claim B :  If c≤∆−|k| for k∈[−∆,∆], there exists an information acquisition-full trade 
equilibrium with the payoffs EUB=∆−k−c and EUS=∆+k−c.  
Proof : For a fixed k∈[−∆,∆], define k=0.5(r+t) then r=2k−t and t=2k−r. The maximal 
allowable information cost ck for the payoffs EUB=∆−0.5(r+t)−c and EUS=∆+0.5(r+t)−c being 
equilibrium payoffs is ck=0.5⋅(∆+min{r,−t}). To find the maximum allowable cost, one solves 
the following problem 
(1)      
2k tr s.t.
],[-tr,
max 
=+ ∆∆∈
0.5⋅(∆+min{r,−t})=
2k tr s.t.
],[-tr,
max 
=+ ∆∆∈
0.5⋅(∆+min{2k−t, −2k+r.}). 
It is easy to see that the min{r,−t} in (1) is non-decreasing in r and −t. Therefore, one should 
start with r=∆ and t=−∆. Then 
(2) 
2k tr s.t.
],[-tr,
max 
=+ ∆∆∈
0.5⋅(∆+min{2k−t, −2k+r.})= 0.5⋅(∆+min{2k+∆, −2k+∆})=0.5⋅(2∆−2|k|). 
So suppose c=ck=∆−|k|. A corresponding equilibrium strategies pair B=S=(1,vL+r, vH+t) 
leading to the payoffs EUB=∆−k−c and EUS=∆+k−c is given as follows: If k∈[−∆,0] then set 
r=∆+2k and t=−∆. If k∈[0,∆] then set r=∆ and t=−∆+2k.5 
Claim C  :If c≤∆−|k|, no full trade equilibrium exists in which (i) no agent acquires 
information or (ii) only one agent acquires information.  
Proof : (i) For c≤∆−|k|<(vH−vL)/4−0.5∆ (Assumption A), Corollary 1 implies that no 
equilibrium exists in which no agent acquires information and full trade occurs. (ii) Suppose 
that only the buyer acquires information and chooses (1,bL,bH) with bL=vL+r and bH=vH+t 
where r,t∈[−∆, ∆]. If there is to be full trade the seller must choose (0,s) with s=vL+r. For any 
r,t∈[−∆, ∆], EUS=∆+(3r+t)/4−(vH−vL)/4<0. Analogously for nB=0 and nS=1. So no full trade 
occurs if only one agent acquires information. QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Since the proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 it is omitted.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Corollary 1 (b) shows that if c<(vH−vL)/4−0.5∆, no equilibrium exists in which no agent 
acquires information and full trade occurs. It is easy to see that since c>∆, there exists no 
equilibrium in which both agents acquire information. Two things remain to be shown.  
                                                 
5 If c<∆−|k|, one can show that there exists a continuum of equilibrium (offer) strategies which lead to 
EUB=∆−k−c and EUS=∆+k−c. See Dang [5]. 
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(1) There exists no equilibrium in which no agent acquires information and partial 
trade occurs. Only prices p∈[E[v]−∆, E[v]+∆] are acceptable for both uninformed agents. 
Proposition 1 shows that no uninformed agent makes any such an offer because of the 
endogenous lemons problem. So no trade occurs if both agents are uninformed. 
(2) There is no equilibrium in which one agent acquires information and full trade as 
well as partial trade occurs. Suppose that the buyer chooses B=(1,bL,bH) with bL=vL+r and 
bH=vH+t where r,t∈[−∆, ∆]. Claim C shows that no full trade exists. It is easy to see that B as 
stated above and S=(0,s) with s=vH+t do not constitute best responses either. Trade occurs if 
v=vH and EUB=0.5(∆−t)−c. For t=−∆, the expected payoff of the informed buyer is maximal 
and yet EUB=∆−c<0. An analogous argument holds if only the seller acquires information. So 
no equilibrium in pure strategies with trade exists. QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Suppose k∈[−∆,∆], r≤k, and t≥k then   
B=(0,b) with 


=+
=+=⋅
 1n if         rv
0n ifk      E[v]
)b(
SL
S   
S=(0,s) with 


=+
=+=⋅
 1n if            tv
0n ifk         E[v]
)s(
BH
B  
constitute best responses (and a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium). 
 
Step 1 (Best responses at the bargaining stage) 
(a) If nB=nS=0,  it is common knowledge that no agent knows the true value. So any 
b=s=E[v]+k for k∈[−∆, ∆] are best responses  and EUB=∆−k and EUS=∆+k. 
(b)  If nB=nS=1, it is common knowledge that both agents know the true value. Since the 
information cost is sunk at the trading stage, any b=s=(vL+r,vH+t) for r,t∈[−∆,∆] are best 
responses and EUB=∆−(r+t)−c and EUB=∆+(r+t)−c  
(c) If nB=1 and nS=0, it is common knowledge that the buyer knows the true value. The 
informed buyer is willing to choose any b=(vL+r, vH+t) where r,t∈[−∆, ∆]. If there is to be full 
trade the seller must choose s=vL+r. For r=t=∆, the seller’ expected payoff is maximal and yet 
EUS=−(vH−vL)/4+2∆<0 (Assumption A). So no full trade occurs. It is easy to see that b=(vL+r, 
vH+t) and s=vH+t for any r≤∆ and t∈[−∆,∆] are best responses and trade occurs with 
probability 0.5 and EUB=0.5(∆−t)−c and EUS=0.5(∆+t).   
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(d) If nB=0 and nS=1, analogously b=vL+r and  s=(vL+r, vH+t) for any r∈[−∆, ∆] and t≥−∆ are 
best responses and trade occurs with probability 0.5 and EUB=0.5(∆−r) and EUS=0.5(∆+r)−c.  
 
Step 2 (Best responses at the information acquisition stage) 
If the buyer chooses nB=0, then EUB=∆−k. If nB=1, then EUB=0.5(∆−t)−c<∆−k since k≤t. So 
nB=0 is a best response. Analogously, nS=0 is a best response of the seller. QED  
 
Appendix B 
This Appendix provides an extension of the binary state setting to a setup where the quality of 
the asset is uniformly distributed between [vL,vH)=V with ∆<vL,vH∈R+. The agents can 
acquire n∈N units of information at the cost C(n) where C(n+1)≥C(n). If an agent acquires n 
units of information then his information set (filter) is as follows: The state space V is 
partitioned in 2n disjoint and equidistant subsets Ij (j=1,....2n) or intervals with length 
δ=(vH−vL)/2n. Formally, the information filter has the following structure (see also Figure A):  
{ } { }{ }nLH2 1-jL1-jj1-jj221 1,2,..,2j  )v(vvq  )q ,[qv:vI I,....,I,I v)I(n, nn =−+=∈===  
 
Figure A (The information filter)  
          Lv              δ+Lv         δ+ 2vL      δ−+ )1j(vL    δ+ jvL                      δ−+ )12(v nL      Hv  
            I1     I2             Ij      I2n 
  
           q0        q1              q2                    q2n     
 
Proposition A 
Suppose that information acquisition is unobservable, C(n)=nc, and ∆<(vH−vL)/2N where N is 
some integer. Define n*=max{0,η} where  


 −


+
−⋅= 3
0.5∆c
vv
ln
ln2
1roundη LH . 
If n*≥1, c≤(1−0.5n*)∆/n*, and n*≤N−2, then in a symmetric full trade equal-spilt equilibrium 
the agents choose nB=nS=n* and b=s=E[vI(n*,v)] and EUB=EUS=∆−C(n*). 
 
Proof of Proposition A  
The information acquisition equilibrium is proven by construction.  
Suppose nB=nS=n. If  v∈Ij(v) for j=1,….,2n  then 
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If the buyer and the seller choose nB=nS=n and play the following symmetric offer strategy 
b=s=E[vI(n,v)] then EUB=EUS=∆−C(n). Suppose the buyer deviates to nB=n+1. His 
information advantage is illustrated in Figure B. 
 
Figure B (Impact of acquiring more information) 
 
Seller        I1           I2  ..........   12nI −       n2I        
 
 
 
Buyer      I1     I2    I3   I4 ..........              12 1nI −+  1n2I +        
 
Suppose that the buyer chooses the following offer strategy as a response to s,   



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

=∈−−+
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2
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v
)(b'
j1n
LH
L
j2n
LH
L
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In other words, if v∈IBj(v) where j=1,3,5,...2n+1−1, then b'(⋅)<s(⋅) and no trade occurs. If 
v∈IBj(v) where j=2,4,6,....,2n+1, then the buyer chooses the lowest bid where trade still occurs, 
i.e. b'(⋅)=s(⋅). The buyer makes an (interim) expected speculative profit π from trade when 
v∈Ij(v) with j=2,4,6,...2n+1, which is given by 
( )
2n
LH
LH2
12j
L
LH2
j
LLH2
1j
L
2
vv
                         
)vv(v
2
)vv(v)vv(v
pE[v]][ 1n
1n1n
+
−
−
−=
−+−−++−+=−= +++πE
 
Trade occurs with probability 0.5 (namely at all v∈IBj(v) for j even) and the ex ante expected 
gross payoff GEU from and the benefit MBI of acquiring one more unit of information are, 
∆+−=∆+=+ + 2
1
2
vv5.0][E5.01)(nGEU n3
LHB π   and 
∆−−=∆−∆+−=−+= ++ 2
1
2
vv
2
1
2
vv(n)GEU1)(nGEU(n)MBI n3
LH
n3
LHBBB . 
The ex ante expected speculative profit is π=(vH−vL)/23+n and the opportunity cost of 
speculation is 0.5∆ (at the equal-split agreement). The reason why for n=0, π=(vH−vL)/8 is 
smaller than the profit in the binary case is that in the binary case the informed buyer knows 
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for sure that v=vH. Since v is uniformly distributed the informed buyer here only knows that 
v∈[E[v],vH]. If the "marginal" benefit of information acquisition is larger than the "marginal" 
cost, the buyer has an incentive to acquire n+1 units of information given that the seller plays 
nS=n and s=E[vIS(n,v)]. The seller faces an analogous incentive problem. There is no 
incentive to acquire more information if  MBI(n)≤[C(n+1)−C(n)], i.e. if (vH−vL)/23+n−0.5∆≤c 
3
0.5∆c
vvln
ln2
1n LH −


+
−⋅=⇔ . 
Due to the integer constraint, n is to round down to the next smallest integer denoted with η. 
For nB=nS=η≥1 and b=s=E[vI(η,v)] being an equilibrium, one has to show that acquiring 
less information than η is not a profitable deviation.  
(i) Suppose, the seller deviates to nS=η−1. (a) If he adjusts his offer for the lemons problem, 
trade occurs with probabililty 0.5 (see Figure B). His expected payoff is EUS=0.5∆−C(η−1). 
This deviation is not profitable if ∆−C(η)>0.5∆−C(η−1) ⇔ c<0.5∆. This deviation is not 
profitable since c<(1−0.5η)∆/η. (b) The less informed seller does not adjust for the lemons 
problem and wants trade to occur with probability 1. Therefore, he chooses s=E[vIB2j−1] if 
v∈ISj (see Figure B). If v∈ISj for j even, the seller suffers a loss of (vH−vL)/2η+1. Conditional 
on observing a trade, this occurs with probability 0.5. The seller's expected payoff is 
EUS=∆−C(η−1)−(vH−vL)/2η+2<0 since by construction η≤N−2 and ∆<(vH−vL)/2N.  
(ii) Suppose, nS=0. Again, because of the lemons problem the uninformed seller has to choose 
s=E[v n2BI ]. Trade occurs with probability 1/2η, i.e. if v∈ η2BI . If This deviation is not 
profitbale if ∆−ηc≥0.5η∆ ⇔ c≤(1−0.5η)∆/η. (Note if s=E[v kBI ] for k<2n then EUS<0.) An 
analogous argumentation holds for the buyer. QED 
 
Numerical Example 
Suppose vL=100, vH=200, N=6, ∆=1, and c=0.2. In a symmetric full trade equal-split 
equilibrium both agents acquire four units of information and EUB=EUS=∆−C(4)=0.2. If 
v=140, then I(n=4,v=140)=I7=[137.5,143.75) and trade is carried out at p=E[vI7]=140.125. 
 
Corollary A 
(a)  If c<(vH−vL)/8−0.5∆ then no efficient outcome is attainable as an equilibrium. 
(b)  If 2∆<c<(vH−vL)/8−0.5∆ then no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exits. 
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